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9 April 1964

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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*UK-Malaysia: [Senior British officials in Malaysia are recommending to London that direct action be taken against Indonesian communications lines along the Indonesian side of the Sarawak border.]

[These officials argue that unless some such action is taken to hamper Indonesia's efforts, Malaysia eventually will be confronted with a long-range subversion problem.]

[Malaysian Government officials also favor strong action to meet this problem. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman stated publicly on 6 April that he considers the cease-fire in Borneo to be "dead."]

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Venezuela: [The Communist-led Armed Forces of National Liberation plans to step up its terrorist activities today in commemoration of the anniversary of its founding.]

[Venezuelan security authorities believe that a series of attacks may occur, including efforts to assassinate senior Venezuelan officials.]

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[Government security authorities are planning to take strong security measures on 9 April.]

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*Argentina: [Authorities are apprehensive over a possible resurgence of guerrilla operations in north-western Argentina]

[The Argentines believe that the capture of several guerrillas and supplies in Salta Province last month point to the existence of a substantial, well-organized movement]

[The size and structure of this organization is still not clear, partly because of the tight security and compartmentation of the guerrillas.]

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[Authorities are still investigating a probable link between the Salta guerrillas and seven others captured in Cordoba Province five days earlier.]

[Argentine authorities have concluded from captured material and other evidence that the movement is Castro-Communist in character, and includes some extreme leftist Peronists. The captured guerrillas wore Cuban-type field dress, and an FAL rifle found at the Salta camp is unquestionably of Cuban origin.]

[Security forces are dubious about their ability to counter guerrilla operations in the large, sparsely settled areas of Salta Province. They are handicapped by the difficult terrain and by the proximity of Bolivia, where guerrilla elements could seek refuge and obtain logistical support.]

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Chile: Radical Party Senator Duran's re-entry into the campaign for the 4 September presidential elections may be a temporary expedient to increase his party's bargaining power.

Duran previously had withdrawn from the campaign following the victory of the Communist-Socialist FRAP alliance in an important congressional by-election on 15 March. This victory strengthened the candidacy of FRAP's presidential candidate, Senator Allende, and persuaded many left-wing Radicals that the party's support should go to him.

[redacted]
Duran believes that his re-entry in the race was the only means of unifying the Radical Party--the country's second largest--and of preventing its formal endorsement of Allende. Such a move would have been a major setback for the democratic forces in the country.

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[redacted] Duran will remain in the contest only a few months in the hope of consolidating his following among the voters, which he estimates at about 400,000, and of obtaining control of the political balance of power. Duran [redacted] has said that he would then be in a position to negotiate with the other candidates.

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The US Embassy quotes the chief of the Liberal Party as saying that it would be disastrous if Duran were to remain in the contest to the end. The Radical left, according to this line of thought, would vote for Allende despite Duran's candidacy, and Duran would only take away from Senator Frei, the front-running Christian Democratic candidate, the support he would otherwise receive from more moderate Radicals.

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[REDACTED] Frei, in effect, concurred in this analysis by stating on 2 April that he believed a Radical candidate would receive an insignificant vote, and that Allende would get two thirds of the Radical vote. At the same time, Frei indicated that he still thought he is ahead of Allende in the race.

[REDACTED]
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NOTES

Mexico - Communist China: A seven-man official Mexican trade delegation left for the Far East on 3 April, for talks aimed at increasing trade with Communist China, as well as several nonbloc countries. The primary purposes of the trip, according to the US Embassy in Mexico, are to arrange for a Mexican trade fair in Peiping and to establish a permanent Mexican trade commission there. Cuba is the only Latin American country which now maintains such an office.

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France - Latin America: De Gaulle's tour of all 10 South American countries will begin either 6 or 13 September and will take 25 days, according to a high official of the French Foreign Ministry. De Gaulle may visit one Central American capital if he can induce all the heads of state in the area to assemble there to meet him. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville has reaffirmed that De Gaulle will not visit Panama or Cuba.

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*Burma: The recent removal of Chit Myaing, the moderate minister of trade development, leaves economic policy in the hands of the leftist-oriented radical element of Ne Win's Revolutionary Council. Chit Myaing, in his battle with the radicals, had regained control of Burmese exports, suggesting that Ne Win was moderating his policy of accelerated socialism. Pro-Western civil service executives in Chit Myaing's ministry are now being removed and some placed under detention.

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